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New Legislation Permitting Stock
Futures: The Long and Winding Road
William J. Brodsky*
Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
("CFMA") in December 2000 in an effort to provide legal certainty to the
over-the-counter derivatives markets and regulatory relief to the registered
futures exchanges.1 In doing so, the CFMA trekked into the murky and of-
ten choppy waters of the boundaries of commodities, securities, and bank-
ing laws and their application to various forms of derivative products. One
of the maelstroms raised in the legislative process was how to treat futures
on individual stocks and narrow-based indexes (referred to as "stock fu-
tures" for this article).
Stock futures had been prohibited since 1982 precisely because a for-
mer Congress had been unable to settle how the securities and commodities
laws would apply to a product that was essentially a leveraged version of
stock. The CFMA addressed this conundrum by permitting stock futures,
but regulating them as both securities and futures subject to joint regulation
by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). While this approach minimized
the regulatory disparities that would have occurred if a security-like product
such as stock futures were regulated only as a commodity, it highlighted the
regulatory anomaly underlying the entire structure of securities regulation
in the U.S. Specifically, the division of the equity and equity derivatives
markets into legal categories of securities and futures, each with different
laws and different regulators, is an antiquated, inadequate, and burdensome
means of overseeing these markets as they face challenges from new tech-
nological and international competitors. The U.S. is the only major securi-
ties market with such a bifurcated system.
* Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Board Options Exchange. Mr.
Brodsky thanks Howard Kramer and Carl Royal of Schiff Hardin & Waite for their assis-
tance in the preparation of the article.
1 The bill was signed into law December 21, 2000.
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This article will explain how the stock futures issue arose, how Con-
gress handled it last year, and the application of the legislation to this new
product. While I believe that the approach taken in the CFMA will allow
stock futures to trade on a level regulatory playing field in many areas with
stock options, which are regulated solely as securities, it will not remove all
the disparities between these two competing products. That will only occur
when Congress acquires the political will to merge the SEC and the CFTC
to create a modem regulatory system for the U.S. equity markets.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CFMA
The history of the CFMA is actually more than 26 years old, dating to
the creation of the CFTC in 1974. At that time, Congress created the CFTC
as a separate agency to regulate the commodities markets, including futures
on commodities. Problems soon arose over jurisdictional boundaries of the
new agency because of the vague reach of the term "future" and the expan-
sive definition of the term "commodity" under the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974 that amended the Commodity Exchange
Act ("CEA").2 The problems led to turf battles between the SEC and the
CFTC when new derivative products arose and both agencies claimed regu-
latory title. The situation eventually led to litigation over options on
GNMA securities, when the SEC approved the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change's ("CBOE") proposal to trade the product under the securities laws.
The CFTC and the futures exchanges sued, claiming that the product was a
commodity option subject to the commodity laws. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals sided with the commodity interests because of the vague
and sweeping breadth of the term "commodity" appeared to capture various
types of financial instruments other than stock.3
To forestall further litigation over other new derivative products, the
SEC and CFTC entered into a jurisdictional accord ("Accord") in 1981
known as the Shad-Johnson Accord (named after the chairmen of the two
agencies at the time), which was enacted into legislation in 1982. The Ac-
cord divided jurisdiction over derivative products between the two agen-
cies, largely along the line of the products under their respective
jurisdictions at the time. The SEC retained jurisdiction over options on se-
curities and securities indexes, while the CFTC retained jurisdiction over
2 Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Sec. l(a)(5),
114 Stat. 2763 (2000) [hereinafter CFMA]. These amendments expanded the definition of
commodity to cover "all other goods and articles, except onions" as well as "all services,
rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt
in."
'CBOT v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982) vacated as moot by, 459 U.S. 1026
(1982).
4 Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983).
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options on commodities (other than those involving securities or indexes of
securities) and on all futures, including those on securities indexes.
The CFTC's jurisdiction over securities futures, however, was limited
to futures on broad-based indexes of securities. During negotiation of the
Accord, the two agencies were unable to reach agreement on the treatment
of futures on individual stocks. The SEC expressed serious concerns that if
stock futures were regulated as futures and not as securities, the lack of se-
curities market protections could cause stock futures to disrupt the market
for the underlying stocks, impair market integrity, and lead to regulatory ar-
bitrage. Unlike securities, including stock options, futures were not subject
to insider trading prohibitions, suitability requirements for recommenda-
tions to customers, and federal margin regulation. Despite these concerns,
the CFTC insisted that stock futures be regulated under the CEA, while the
SEC believed they should be regulated as securities. As a consequence of
the disagreement, the two agencies determined to ban futures on individual
stocks. They also agreed to prohibit futures on narrow-based indexes of
stocks, which easily could be used as a surrogate for a future on an individ-
ual stock.5 The two agencies also agreed to do a study on the issue, but they
never conducted the study. As I will discuss later in this article, had the
agencies conducted such a study, they would have been able to analyze the
issues arising from stock futures in a more measured manner rather than in
the forced, hurried manner of the CFMA legislative process last year.
The inadequacy of the Accord was soon exposed. The stock market
crash in October 1987 highlighted the illogic of separating jurisdiction over
securities and security-based derivatives between two different agencies
with completely different legislative mandates and philosophies. A presi-
dential task force study of the crash emphasized that the markets for securi-
ties and derivatives had become inextricably linked and the Department of
Treasury soon introduced legislation to consolidate jurisdiction of all secu-
rity-based futures in the SEC.6 Strong lobbying efforts by the futures indus-
try easily derailed the legislation, largely because oversight of the SEC and
the CFTC was split between different committees in the House and Senate
and the agricultural committees with authority over the futures industry did
not want to relinquish any jurisdiction.
For the next decade, little attention was given to amending the Accord
and scant interest was shown in reopening the prohibition on stock futures.
Part of the lack of interest in stock futures emanated from the dismal ex-
perience of stock futures abroad. The handful of foreign markets trading
stock futures garnered little volume and posed no competitive threat to U.S.
markets. During the huge growth in stock trading volume and the run-up in
5 Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) (1936) (before amendment by the
CFMA).6 Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, January 1988.
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the stock market in the late 1990s, the futures exchanges decided that they
wanted to extend their market share from broad-based futures indexes into
sector based indexes, and sued the SEC to gain this ability.7
Despite the general lack of attention to the Accord, however, market-
place changes over the decade further dramatized the antiquated nature of
the Accord. New financial products were introduced that crossed the
boundaries between securities, commodities, and banking products. These
so-called "hybrid products" raised legal uncertainty as to their status under
the Accord. The development of the swaps and over-the-counter ("OTC")
derivative markets also raised legal uncertainty issues. Swaps and OTC de-
rivatives are privately negotiated derivative contracts between institutional
counterparties. These products grew exponentially in volume and sophisti-
cation during the 1980s and 1990s and became an important part of fman-
cial markets. Yet, legal uncertainty existed as to whether these products
came within the ambit of the CEA. If they did, they would run afoul of the
CEA's prohibition on off-exchange trading of futures unless exempted by
the CFTC. A concept release issued by the CFTC in 1998 that suggested
that many OTC derivative products might be deemed futures created further
legal uncertainty concerns over these products.8
After issuance of the CFTC's Concept Release, OTC derivative dealers
pushed for legislation to exempt swaps and OTC derivatives from the CEA.
The futures exchanges at first objected, claiming that equity swaps were in
essence single stock futures. Later, the futures exchanges realized that the
upcoming need to pass legislation to authorize the CFTC provided them
with a vehicle to push for lifting the stock futures prohibition. Hence, they
agreed to support the OTC dealers if the Accord's prohibition on stock fu-
tures were lifted. Congress turned to both these issues when it began the
process of enacting legislation to reauthorize the CFTC in 1999.
As in 1982, when Congress considered the jurisdictional issues involv-
ing stock futures, there was disagreement in 1999 between the securities
markets and the futures markets as to how stock futures should be regu-
lated. The futures markets wanted stock futures to be regulated like other
futures, except for a few securities law provisions such as a prohibition
against insider trading. The securities markets objected because stock fu-
tures are in essence just a surrogate for highly leveraged stock. In light of
the regulatory disparities between securities regulation and futures regula-
tion, a lifting of the prohibition against stock futures without addressing the
disparities would subject the markets trading securities, and particularly
stock options, to substantial competitive disadvantages and could have a
dramatic effect on the stock market. During consideration by Congress of
7 Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 187 F.3d
713 (7th Cir. 1999).
8 Commodities Futures Trading Commission Proposed Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. 26114 (May
12, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R §§ 34-35).
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the CFMA, the securities markets insisted that if the prohibition on stock
futures were lifted, the securities markets and the futures markets must op-
erate on a level playing field. The securities markets were concerned that
the law in effect prior to the enactment of the CFMA gave more favorable
treatment to the products traded at futures exchanges, as compared with
those traded at securities exchanges, in areas such as margin requirements,
tax treatment, and transaction fees. Because stock futures can be used to
perform many of the same functions as equity options, the securities ex-
changes did not want the law to create artificial incentives for investors to
use stock futures as opposed to equity options. The President's Working
Group on Financial Markets ("Working Group") issued a report that agreed
with the views of the securities markets.9 The Working Group's report at
page 39 stated that the prohibitions on stock futures could be lifted "if is-
sues about the integrity of the underlying securities market and regulatory
arbitrage are resolved."
The SEC and CFTC attempted to address the regulatory disparities is-
sues. They issued a joint letter in March 2000 that laid out the skeleton of a
system of dual regulation of stock futures. 0 The agriculture committees in
Congress were impatient for the regulators to fill in the details of the SEC
and CFTC system, so they introduced legislation in June 2000. The legisla-
tion would have ignored the SEC/CFTC agreement and instead treated
stock futures primarily as futures subject to the CEA, with SEC involve-
ment limited to several discrete areas. The House Commerce Committee
markup of the bill ("H.R.4541") completely revised the stock futures por-
tion and inserted an SEC version that instituted a full system of dual regula-
tion for the product. Although changes in certain respects were made to
H.R. 4541 as it wound its way through the legislative process, the CFMA
largely adopted the version of H.R. 4541 that emerged from the Commerce
Committee.
II. ANALYSIS OF STOCK FUTURES PROVISIONS IN CFMAA
The CFMA lifts the prohibition on single-stock futures and narrow-
based stock index futures and allows these futures to be traded under a sys-
tem of joint regulation by the SEC and the CFTC. It does this by amending
both the CEA and the federal securities laws. The CFMA amends certain
9 Over-the-Counter-Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act, Report of
the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets
and the Commodity Exchange Act (November 1999). The Working Group is composed of
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, and the Chairmen of the SEC and CFTC.
10 Letter dated March 2, 2000, from Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, and William J. Rai-
ner, Chairman, CFTC, to the Honorable Richard Lugar, Chairman, Senate Agriculture, Nu-
trition & Forestry Committee and The Honorable Phil Gramm, Chairman, Senate Banking
Committee.
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definitions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). It de-
fines the term "security future" to mean a contract of sale for future delivery
of a single security or of a narrow-based security index, and it provides that
security futures are included in the definition of "equity security. l l
The CFMA rewrites important jurisdictional provisions in the CEA.
An exception to the general rule that the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction
over all futures contracts is made in the case of security futures. In addi-
tion, the SEC is granted "jurisdiction and authority over security futures"
notwithstanding any other provision of the CEA.12 As a result of this legis-
lation, the CFTC and the SEC have concurrent jurisdiction over single-
stock futures and narrow-based index futures. 3 The CFTC retains exclu-
sive jurisdiction over "broad-based" stock index futures contracts, i.e. fu-
tures on a stock index that is not a "narrow-based security index.' '4
Under the CFMA, stock futures can be traded at both securities ex-
changes and at futures exchanges, and exchanges that trade stock futures
must be registered with both the SEC and the CFTC' s CFTC-regulated ex-
changes that fall within the statutory definition of "exchange" in the 1934
Act solely by reason of trading stock futures can file a notice registration
with the SEC that is effective immediately upon submission of the required
information. 6 Similarly, national securities exchanges registered with the
SEC may be designated as contract markets in stock futures through an ex-
pedited notice registration with the CFTC if stock futures are the only fu-
tures contracts traded by such exchange. The designation is effective
" CFMA § 201 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(1 1) and (55) (2001)).
12 CFMA §25 1, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a.
13 The term "narrow-based security index" is defined to mean an index that satisfies any
one of the following criteria:
1. The index has nine or fewer component securities;
2. One security comprises more than 30% of the index's weighting;
3. The five highest weighted component securities in the aggregate comprise more than
60% of the index's weighting; or
4. The bottom quartile of the component securities has a combined average daily trading
volume of less than $50 million, or $30 million if the index includes at least fifteen secu-
rities.
In certain particular circumstances, an index will not be treated as a "narrow-based secu-
rity index" even though it met one of the above criteria. CFMA § 201 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(B)).
14 See Cong. Rec. S11924, S11926 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1999) (remarks of Senator Richard
Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee) [hereinafter Lugar Remarks].
15 In order to be eligible to trade stock futures, a futures exchange must either be a desig-
nated contract market or a registered derivatives transaction execution facility. CFMA §
251, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a. In other words, an exempt board of trade that is not subject to
CFTC regulation cannot trade stock futures.
16 CFMA § 202, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(g)
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immediately upon the submission of notice to the CFTC containing the in-
formation prescribed by the CFTC.
1 7
Thus, a security or futures exchange can select its primary regulator as
either the SEC or the CFTC for stock futures. If a securities exchange se-
lects the SEC, it will be regulated primarily as a securities exchange, but
will be subject to CEA provisions in important areas, described below.
Similarly, a futures exchange desiring to be regulated primarily under the
CEA can do so, but will be subject to important 1934 Act provisions. A se-
curities exchange could choose the CFTC as its primary regulator as long as
it registers as a full contract market with the CFTC and files the "notice reg-
istration" with the SEC. The reverse is true for a futures exchange desiring
primary regulation by the SEC. The key point is that a market can pick its
primary regulator, but will be subject to dual regulation in important areas
designed to ensure consistent regulatory treatment regardless of the primary
regulator.
With respect to clearing, stock futures may be cleared either by a
CFTC-regulated clearing organization or an SEC-regulated clearing agency.
A CFTC-regulated clearing organization is not required to register with the
SEC solely by reason of clearing stock futures.18  Similarly, an SEC-
regulated clearing agency is not required to register with the CFTC solely
by reason of clearing stock futures.1
The stock index futures contracts currently traded at futures exchanges
are required by the CEA to be cash-settled. In contrast, the equity options
traded on securities exchanges are physically settled (i.e., shares of the un-
derlying stock are delivered when the option is exercised), while index op-
tions are cash-settled. The CFMA does not favor one form of settlement
over the other, but instead allows an exchange to choose either form of set-
tlement for stock futures.20
The CFMA requires that the margin requirements for stock futures
must be consistent with the margin requirements for comparable options
contracts and that the initial and maintenance margin levels for stock fu-
tures not be lower than the margin level (exclusive of premium) required for
comparable options.2' To ensure that the margin rules will be the same for
broker-dealers and futures commission merchants ("FCMs") who collect
margin from customers on stock futures, the CFMA authorizes the Federal
17 CFMA § 252.
18 However, a CFTC-regulated clearing organization must have arrangements in place
with an SEC-regulated clearing agency to effect the delivery of the securities underlying the
stock futures contract, unless such contract is cash-settled. CFMA § 206 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78q-l(b)(7)).
'9 CFMA § 112, adding § 5b(a)(2).
20 CFMA § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(h)(3)).
21 CFMA § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78g).
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Reserve Board to prescribe the margin rules for stock futures or to delegate
such authority to the SEC and CFTC acting jointly.22
The margin provisions form the core of the dual regulatory structure.
Margin is perhaps the feature of an exchange-traded derivative contract
with the greatest competitive and regulatory impact. Traditionally, futures
markets require much smaller margins than do securities markets. "Mar-
gin" is the performance bond required to establish a position in the futures
or options markets and the initial down payment in the stock market. Stock
index futures margins usually involve five percent or less of the contract
value, whereas the Federal Reserve Board establishes a fifty percent margin
requirement for stock transactions. For securities options, purchasers must
pay the full purchase price, while sellers must put up margin equal to the
premium plus fifteen percent for options on broad-based indexes, and the
premium plus twenty percent for options on stocks or narrow-based in-
dexes. The reason for the difference in margin between stock index futures
and stock index options lies primarily in the fact that the securities options
margin is overseen by the SEC, while the stock index futures margin is
overseen by the CFTC. The split oversight produced dramatically different
margin levels for competing products because of the different regulatory
philosophies of the two agencies.
If stock futures were permitted under the same split margin regulation,
there would be a significant potential for stock futures margin to differ from
the stock options margin. This difference would have a dramatic impact on
the competitiveness of options relative to futures. For example, an options
writer must pay the premium received plus $4,000 (twenty percent) to es-
tablish an options position worth $20,000. If stock futures margin were
only ten percent (double the amount for stock index futures), a futures
trader need only put up $2,000 to establish an equivalent futures position.
This would make the stock option, all other things being equal, at least
twice as expensive as a comparable futures contract. To avoid this dispar-
ity, the CFMA makes clear that stock futures initial and maintenance mar-
gin levels cannot be lower than margin levels for comparable stock options.
At current stock options margin levels, this translates into initial and main-
tenance stock futures margin levels of twenty percent of the contract value
for both speculators and hedgers in stock futures contracts. Moreover, to
prevent other facets of margin regulation from creating disparities between
stock options and stock futures, the CFMA requires that all other areas of
margin requirements be comparable between stock futures and stock op-
tions. These other areas include, for example, the nature and adequacy of
22 CFMA § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78g); CFMA § 251 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a).
The Federal Reserve Board subsequently delegated this authority to the SEC and CFTC on
March 6, 2001. Letter dated March 6, 2001, from Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to James E. Newsome, Acting Chairman, CFTC,
and Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, SEC.
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collateral posted for margin and the instruments permitted to act as margin
offsets to the option and futures positions.
A separate law amended the Internal Revenue Code to specify the tax
treatment for stock futures.23 As with margin, the tax treatment of stock fu-
tures versus stock options has a direct impact on the competitiveness of the
products. Prior to the CFMA, all futures contracts received favorable
sixty/forty tax treatment (sixty percent long-term treatment, forty percent
short-term treatment). For securities options, only broad-based index op-
tions received favorable sixty/forty treatment for all participants. Stock op-
tions and narrow-based index options were taxed 100 percent at short-term
rates except for options market makers, who receive sixty/forty treatment.
Thus, if stock futures were taxed like other futures, customers would have
an incentive to use futures rather than options solely for tax reasons.
To prevent competitive differences in tax treatment between stock fu-
tures and stock options, customer gains or losses in stock futures transac-
tions are treated as short-term capital gains or losses, which is consistent
with the tax treatment afforded to customers who buy and sell equity op-
tions or the underlying stocks.24 If the transaction in stock futures is ef-
fected for the account of someone who qualifies as a "dealer" in security
futures contracts, gains and losses are treated as sixty percent long-term
capital gain or loss and forty percent short-term capital gain or loss. A per-
son will be treated as a dealer for this purpose if the Treasury Department
passes regulations that determine that such person performs, with respect to
the stock futures at issue, functions similar to market-makers in listed op-
tions. 25 All such dealer transactions are marked for the market at the end of
the tax year and taxable as of that time even if the position remains open. It
is important that the definition of "dealer" in security futures contracts in
the Treasury regulations be sufficiently narrow so as to include only those
futures "locals" that provide liquidity on a regular or continuous basis,
which is the key attribute of options market makers.
Another regulatory disparity between stock options and futures han-
dled by the CFMA involves federal transaction fees. All securities transac-
tions are subject to a federal transaction fee pursuant to Section 31 of the
1934 Act. This includes stock options transactions, which are assessed
based on the value of the premium. Futures are not subject to a comparable
' The provisions for the tax treatment of security futures were enacted as part of the
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1234B and 1256(g)).
24 As stated by Senator Lugar, the tax treatment of stock futures "would be comparable to
the tax treatment of options on securities to ensure a level playing field between the mar-
kets." Lugar Remarks at S 11926.
2 Treasury is directed to pass regulations defining security futures dealer not later than
July 1, 2001. See H.R.5662, Title IV-Tax Treatment of Securities Futures Contracts. The
Treasury solicited comments on the definition of security dealer, but as of the date of this ar-
ticle, has not passed final rules. See 66 Fed. Reg. 13836 (March 7,2001).
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federal transaction fee. The CFMA designates stock futures as securities so
that they would be subject to a Section 31 fee. Because futures do not in-
volve a premium as do options, the transaction fee assessments on stock fu-
tures transactions will initially be set at $0.02 for each round-turn
26transaction. 6 This fee is the same regardless of whether the transaction isexecuted on a securities exchange or a futures exchange.
III. RESOLUTION OF REGULATORY ISSUES
As noted above, stock futures are treated both as futures contracts sub-
ject to the CEA and as securities subject to the federal securities laws. This
means that a person committing fraud or manipulation in connection with
the purchase or sale of stock futures could be prosecuted under both laws.
The CFMA amended Sections 9(b), 9(g), 20(d) and 21A(a)(1) of the 1934
Act, which relate to the trading of options and their underlying securities, so
that the prohibitions against manipulation and other wrongful activities ex-
pressly apply to stock futures.27 In addition, Section 16 of the 1934 Act was
amended to clarify that its provisions regarding short-swing profits by cor-
porate insiders apply to transactions in stock futures.28
The CFMA requires that stock futures have listing standards that are
substantially identical to listed stock options.29 For example, the listing
standards of a securities exchange requires that only a broker or dealer sub-
ject to suitability rules comparable to those of the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD") may effect transactions in stock futures.
Similarly, the listing standards of a futures exchange must require that only
FCMs subject to suitability rules comparable to those of the NASD may so-
licit, accept any order for, or otherwise deal in any transaction in connection
with stock futures.3 °
Rule changes of futures exchanges that file a notice registration with
the SEC are subject to varying degrees of SEC review depending on the
subject of the rule change:
* Rule changes relating to margin (except those raising margin
levels) require full SEC review and approval under Section
19(b)(2) of the 1934 Act.
* Rule changes relating to higher margin levels, fraud or ma-
nipulation, recordkeeping, reporting, listing standards or deci-
26 CFMA § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ee).
27 CFMA § 205 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b), 78i(g), 78t(d) and 78o-l(a)(1)).
28 CFMA § 208 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p).
29 CFMA § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(f)(3)); CFMA § 251 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §
2a).
30 The NASD has heightened suitability rules for options. Presumably, the options suit-
ability rules (rather than the regular securities suitability rules) would apply to stock futures.
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mal pricing for security futures products; sales practices for se-
curity futures products; or rules effectuating the exchange's
obligation to enforce the securities laws must be filed with the
SEC under the provisions of new Section 19(b)(7). Such rules
changes must be filed concurrently with the CFTC. The fu-
tures exchange can put such rule changes into effect as soon as
they are approved by the CFTC or are otherwise permitted to
go into effect under applicable CFTC regulations. The SEC
can abrogate such a rule change within sixty days if, after con-
sulting with the CFTC, the SEC determines that such a rule
change unduly burdens competition, conflicts with the securi-
ties laws, or is inconsistent with the public interest .and the pro-
tection of investors. If the futures exchange wishes to refile an
abrogated rule change, it must do so pursuant to the normal no-
tice and comment provisions of Section 19(b)(2).
Rule changes relating to subjects other than those listed above
are exempt from SEC review.3a
When the SEC is the primary regulator for a securities exchange, the
exchange must file all of its rule changes with the SEC. The SEC is re-
quired to consult with and consider the views of the CFTC prior to approv-
ing or disapproving a proposed rule change filed by a securities market that
primarily concerns conduct related to transactions in security futures. If the
CFTC comments in writing on such a rule, the SEC must respond in writing
to such comments before approving or disapproving the rule. If the CFTC
notifies the SEC that such rule would adversely effect the liquidity or effi-
ciency of the market for security futures or impose a burden on competition
not necessary or appropriate, the SEC can still approve the rule, but only if
it finds that such rule is necessary and appropriate in furtherance of the pur-
poses of Section 19 of the 1934 Act notwithstanding the CFTC's determina-
tion.32 It is important to recognize that, even with those provisions, the rule
review process for securities-based stock futures exchanges will be far more
burdensome than for commodities-based stock futures exchanges. The
CFTC merely requires a short certification by a contract market that is
changing a rule and does not conduct any review of the rule change. In
contrast, the SEC requires its exchanges to file a detailed form explaining
the basis for a proposed rule change. The SEC conducts a full review of
every proposed rule change and its approval is required for most exchange
rule changes. Hence, a securities-based exchange will have all of its rule
changes subjected to the more lengthy SEC review process, while a com-
31 CFMA § 202 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(7)).
3 CFMA § 202 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9)).
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modities-based exchange will only have a small category of rules subjected
to SEC review.
Under the CEA, as amended by the CFMA, prior CFTC approval is not
needed for rule changes by futures exchanges, except for those that amend
the terms and conditions of agricultural contracts that have been listed for
trading and have open interest. Accordingly, neither traditional futures ex-
changes nor securities exchanges that file a notice registration with the
CFTC are required to obtain prior CFTC approval of their rule changes.33
IV. MINIMIZING REGULATORY OVELAP AND DUPLICATION
Having stock futures governed by both the CEA and the federal securi-
ties laws creates a risk of overregulation because all of the regulatory re-
quirements from one statutory scheme are added on top of the requirements
from the other statutory scheme. Market intermediaries in particular were
concerned that they could become subject to duplicative, and possibly con-
flicting, regulatory mandates. The CFMA attempts to minimize overlap-
ping and duplicative regulation in a number of areas.
The CFMA provides for expedited SEC notice registration of CFTC-
registered FCMs and introducing brokers that would fall within the statu-
tory definition of the terms "broker" or "dealer" solely by reason of effect-
ing transactions in security futures. Broker-dealers that limit their securities
business to transactions in security futures are exempted from certain speci-
fied sections of the 1934 Act and are also exempted from the requirement to
join the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. Floor brokers and floor
traders at futures exchanges are exempted from the requirement to register
as a broker-dealer.34 The CFMA also provides for expedited CFTC notice
registration of securities broker-dealers that would fall within the statutory
definition of the terms "futures commission merchant" or "introducing bro-
ker" solely by reason of effecting transactions in security futures. Broker-
dealers who act as a floor broker or floor trader are exempted from register-
ing as such with the CFTC if they confine their activities in futures to secu-
rity futures.
35
The SEC and CFTC, in consultation with each other, are directed to is-
sue such rules, regulations, or orders as are necessary to avoid duplicative
or.conflicting regulations applicable to broker-dealers and FCMs with re-
spect to the treatment of customer funds, securities, maintenance of books
and records, financial reporting, or other financial responsibility rules in-
volving security futures.3 Securities exchanges, national securities associa-
tions, futures exchanges and national futures associations are similarly
33 CFMA § 113.
34 CFMA § 203 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(1 1)-(12)).35 CFMA § 252 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6f(a)).
36 CFMA § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3)).
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directed to adopt rules in order to prevent duplicative regulation of firms
with respect to financial responsibility rules involving security futures.37
The CFMA creates a new category of registrant known as a "limited
purpose national securities association." It is expected that the National Fu-
tures Association ('NFA") will become a registered national securities as-
sociation for the limited purpose of regulating the activities of its members
who act as brokers or dealers in security futures. Futures market intermedi-
aries that register as broker dealers solely because of their security futures
activities are not required to join the NASD if they are members of NFA.38
Similarly, a broker-dealer that files a notice registration with the CFTC
must be a member of the NASD, but is not required to become a member of
NFA.39
Persons or entities who are registered with either the SEC or the CFTC,
and who are required to register with the other agency solely because of
their activities with respect to security futures, are referred to as "notice reg-
istrants." The CFMA directs the SEC to cooperate with the CFTC in con-
nection with the SEC's proposed examinations of notice registrants. The
SEC must notify the CFTC of such proposed examination and consult with
the CFTC concerning the feasibility and desirability of coordinating such
examination with examinations conducted by the CFTC in order to avoid
unnecessary duplication or undue regulatory burdens. Before conducting
such an examination, the SEC must make use of reports and other informa-
tion available from the CFTC. If the SEC nonetheless conducts such an ex-
amination, it must notify the CFTC and, upon request, furnish to the CFTC
any report prepared by the SEC in connection with such examination. 40 The
CFMA imposes substantially the same requirements on the CFTC in con-
nection with a CFTC examination of notice registrants.41
If the SEC brings an enforcement proceeding against a notice regis-
trant, it must provide the CFTC with notice of the commencement of such
proceeding and a copy of any order entered by the SEC in such a proceed-
ing.42 The CFTC is required to notify the SEC of the commencement of
any proceeding brought against a notice registrant.43 The CFMA also
amended the CEA to provide that the CFTC's authority to investigate the
cash markets underlying futures contracts shall not apply to investigations
involving any security underlying a security futures product."
31 CFMA § 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f and 78o-3(1)).
" CFMA § 203 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)).
'9 CFMA § 252 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6f(a)).40 CFMA § 204 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b)).
41 CFMA § 251 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a).42 CFMA § 205 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 78u).
41 CFMA § 253 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 12(a) and 13a-1(h)).
44 CFMA § 251 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 20).
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V. THE PROCESS MOVING AHEAD
The stock futures provisions of the CFMA are quite lengthy -
over 100 pages of legislative text. The SEC and the CFTC will have to pass
dual regulations in many areas to implement the bill, and Treasury will have
to pass regulations for its tax treatment. Moreover, there are many impor-
tant regulatory issues still left unresolved. For example, the securities op-
tions markets are subject to common clearing under one clearing agency,
The Options Clearing Corporation. In contrast, each futures exchange op-
erates its own captive clearing corporation for products traded on that ex-
change. The CFMA equivocates on which system (or hybrid of systems) to
use for stock futures. Each stock futures exchange could choose to use
common clearing or its own affiliated clearing agency. The CFMA requires
that, after two years of trading stock futures or 180 days after stock futures
volume equals ten percent of stock options volume, whichever is later, there
would have to be linked and coordinated clearing for stock futures unless
the SEC and CFTC determine otherwise. Similarly, stock futures markets
will only be subject to the national market system provisions of Section
1 1A of the 1934 (e.g., consolidated quote and transaction tape) if and when
and the SEC and the CFTC jointly agree to apply these provisions to stock
futures.
I believe the failure of the two agencies to agree on whether the com-
mon clearing and national market system provisions covering the securities
options markets apply to stock futures at the outset of trading is due to the
limited time period the agencies had to analyze these issues. After the two
agencies issued their preliminary plans for joint regulation in March 2001,
the Agriculture Committees in Congress gave them only these months to re-
solve all the issues. It is no surprise that the two agencies had to defer final
action on some of the more contentious issues. Had the agencies conducted
a joint study on stock futures in the 1980s as they had agreed as a result of
the Accord, they would have confronted these issues in a more studious and
measured way.
The regulatory structure produced by the CFMA is complicated, but
necessarily so in order to ensure adequate dual regulation. While it should
provide a level, competitive playing field for the introduction and trading of
stock futures, the structure is not ideal. The bifurcated structure emanates
from the anachronistic system of split jurisdiction of equity products be-
tween the SEC and CFTC.
The United States is virtually unique in the world in respect to its regu-
latory structure of the equity markets. No other major equity market is sub-
ject to a complete split of regulatory jurisdiction between the securities
markets and the securities futures markets. There always is one regulatory
authority ultimately responsible for all the equity markets.
This anomalous system in the United States always had its weakest
stress point at stock futures. These instruments, for all intents and purposes,
are securities. There is no rational reason to call a stock option a security
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but not a stock future. Yet, because it is called a "future," the commodities
interests have fought against regulating stock futures simply as securities.
Thus, to lift the prohibition in the Accord, it was necessary for the SEC and
CFTC to acquiesce in a shared system of jurisdiction.
The CFMA attempts to rationalize the shared jurisdiction by providing
for notice registrations, minimizing regulatory duplication when possible,
and establishing consistent treatment in key areas between stock options
and stock futures. To make the structure operate smoothly, the SEC and the
CFTC will have to work together on common rules and interpretations as
well as surveillance and enforcement oversight. This could pose some in-
teresting challenges for the two agencies. The SEC's traditional focus on
investor protection and full disclosure is different from the CFTC's empha-
sis on facilitating price discovery and commercial hedging. The ability of
the two agencies to cooperate and fulfill the mandates of the CFMA will be
particularly tested as the agencies fill in the specifics of the regulatory struc-
ture through rulemaking.
As an active participant in the legislative process of the CFMA, I know
it was a high priority of Congress to ensure identical regulatory treatment
for stock options and stock futures.45 As the agencies adopt dual rulemak-
ing over the coming year in such key areas as margin and (for Treasury) tax
treatment, it will be crucial to keep regulatory consistency as the touchstone
for their efforts. Otherwise, the CFMA structure will splinter into the trou-
blesome bifurcated system that exists for all other equity products.
Of course, it would be easier if there were only one regulator of stock
futures through a merger of the SEC and CFTC. That would provide uni-
fied oversight over stocks, stock options, and stock futures. It is unlikely in
the near term that Congress will acquire the political will to do so. The
House of Representatives recently consolidated oversight of most securities
and banking activities into the Financial Services Committee, similar to the
consolidated oversight in the Senate Banking Committee. Both the House
and Senate, however, continued to maintain separate oversight of the CFTC
in their respective agriculture committees. Consequently, the jerry-rigged
structure of the CFMA will have to suffice. Thus, on December 20, 2000,
with the start of full-scale stock futures trading, the long and winding road
that began with the Accord in 1982 will have come to the conclusion of the
first part of the journey. With the bifurcated regulatory system, however,
the road will still meander onwards.
45 As of the date of this article, the SEC and CFTC had proposed, and in most cases
adopted, rules to implement various provisions of the CFMA regarding stock futures. See,
e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44724 (August 21, 2001). Interestingly, the agen-
cies had not yet proposed rules concerning the margin treatment of stock futures.
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